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A B S T R A C T
The Electric Vehicles (EVs) market has seen rapid growth recently despite the anxiety about driving range. Recent
proposals have explored charging EVs on the move, using dynamic wireless charging that enables power exchange
between the vehicle and the grid while the vehicle is moving. Specifically, part of the literature focuses on the
intelligent routing of EVs in need of charging. Inter-Vehicle communications (IVC) play an integral role in
intelligent routing of EVs around a static charging station or dynamic charging on the road network. However,
IVC is vulnerable to a variety of cyber attacks such as spoofing. In this paper, a probabilistic cross-layer Intrusion
Detection System (IDS), based on Machine Learning (ML) techniques, is introduced. The proposed IDS is capable
of detecting spoofing attacks with more than 90% accuracy. The IDS uses a new metric, Position Verification using
Relative Speed (PVRS), which seems to have a significant effect in classification results. PVRS compares the
distance between two communicating nodes that is observed by On-Board Units (OBU) and their estimated
distance using the relative speed value that is calculated using interchanged signals in the Physical (PHY) layer.
1. Introduction
Two of the main prohibiting factors for the adoption of the Electric
Vehicles (EVs) across Europe are the driving range (i.e. the distance the
vehicle can cover before it needs to recharge), and the lack of supporting
charging infrastructure. One solution to these pivotal factors would be
the implementation of stochastic optimisation techniques for the
charging procedure of EVs [1]. However, this research area has specific
limitations regarding the optimal placement of charging stations in a city,
queue stability issues, especially when few charging stations must facil-
itate a large number of requests, among others. Furthermore, the
deployment of charging infrastructure requires changes to the existing
civil infrastructure, which are costly and take a long time to implement.
To overcome these prohibiting factors, it is important that novel and
cost-effective approaches to help in the adoption of EVs are proposed.
A novel solution initially proposed in Refs. [2,3] to increase the
driving range of EVs is the use of city buses as energy sources on the
move. The EVs can make efficient use of Mobile Energy Disseminators
(MED), which operate as mobile charging stations, and Static Charging
Stations (SCS) [2]. The role of a MED can be taken over by city buses that
follow a predefined route across the city. Inner-city busses repeatedly
move along a predefined route. An EV can establish a communication
with a MED and approach it at a specific location along the predefined
route to complete the charging process. The proposed method exploits
Inter-Vehicle Communication (IVC) in order to eco-route EVs. This
innovative approach drives the investigation towards integrated solu-
tions that allow EVs to charge while moving through the city, without the
need for a significant change in the existing road infrastructure.
Dynamic Wireless Charging (DWC) is a technology with great po-
tential, but further R&D may still be required towards its applicability. A
number of companies are actively developing DWC solutions, both in the
research and testing phases [4–7]. In Ref. [8] the authors have proposed
an intelligent routing technique that can be used to implement a dynamic
charging model on existing road infrastructures. The proposed system for
Dynamic Wireless Charging is based mainly on wireless
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications and uses a route optimisation
solution. The usage of wireless communication among EVs and MED
coordinates the real-time booking procedure for either the SCS or the
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MED, optimizing waiting times. Specifically, nodes that enter the system
broadcast periodically beacon messages, known as Cooperative Aware-
ness Message (CAM), to inform of their presence. Every beacon message
contains a Node Identifier, GPS coordinates, GPS speed, current Time-
stamp and MAC address of the EV. These messages are transmitted
several times per second using Dedicated Short Range Communication
(DSRC) and Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) tech-
nology, based on the IEEE 802.11p standard. However, these messages
are vulnerable to a wide range of cyber threats, such as eavesdropping,
spoofing and modification attacks.
In particular, a spoofing attack against the communication between
EVs could allow an attacker to modify the charging process (e.g. changing
the order of charging) either on a MED or on a SCS for its benefit,
affecting legitimate EVs. A spoofing attack is one of the most dangerous
attacks for route optimisation systems. This type of attack allows an
attacker to spoofs its real geographical position in the information sent
within CAM messages, making other nodes believe that the vehicle is in
another position [9]. This way an attacker can benefit against competing
EVs, since the charging sequence is based on navigation decisions. Every
EV has a table that contains the locations and the node identifiers of every
other EV in its vicinity. The information about the location of every
vehicle is extracted from their GPS system and sent to its neighbors
through CAM messages. An attacker can create an illusion that he is
present at a specific location by altering the location table of the GPS
System or by generating and sending stronger fake location signals to its
GPS receiver. The presence of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
capable of detecting GPS falsification is essential in such a system.
Moreover, the spoofing attack disrupts the legitimate communication
between two nodes, causing similar effects to those of a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack. At the same time it is more difficult to be detected since it
requires only a very small number of malicious packets to be produced.
The proposed IDS uses an additional metric from the Physical (PHY)
layer: the estimated relative speed along with the GPS parameters are
making it more efficient in detecting such attacks.
Motivation: The main motivation of this paper is to investigate how
the presence of a spoofing attacker as an inner node of the system affects
the total travel time that must be optimized in Ref. [8]. Specific examples
are described in which the presence of an attacker can violate the right
order for the charging of EVs using the MED or the SCS. These examples
are not unique, however they are highly probable and can incur a sig-
nificant increase in the total travel time. This indicates that more
advanced attacks, possibly involving numerous coordinated attackers,
can impact and degrade the operation of the system. However, the
detailed analysis of coordinated attack models is out of scope of this
paper. Here, we show that a probabilistic IDS is appropriate in order to
detect and mitigate the presence of at least one attacker.
Concluding, an IDS based on Machine Learning (ML) is developed in
order to detect spoofing attackers. Based on the outcomes of the IDS,
attackers are excluded from the Dynamic Wireless Charging mechanism.
Another contribution of the article is the introduction of a novel metric
that is used as a separate feature for the ML algorithms. This metric
named Position Verification using Relative Speed (PVRS) is based on the
relative speed Δu which is estimated through interchanged signals in the
PHY layer. PVRS compares the distance between two communicating
nodes through their on-board Units (OBU) and the estimated distance
that is calculated using the Δu value. The effect of the proposed PVRS
metric in the performance of the probabilistic IDS was an increase of 6%
in accuracy. Therefore, PVRS is an appropriate metric especially for the
detection of a spoofing attack. This is the first proposed ML IDS in the
literature that can effectively detect a spoofing attacker in a realistic
application, alleviating also its effects. The detection engine of the pro-
posed IDS is based on several ML algorithms, such as Random Forest (RF)
and k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN), using metrics in a cross-layer approach.
Both supervised learning techniques are very popular, with the k-NN
being robust against noisy training data like the ones obtained from a
real-life urban environment and RF being one of the most accurate
algorithms, reducing the chance of over-fitting. The outcomes of both
supervised ML approaches are correlated using data fusion techniques in
order to improve the overall performance of the IDS.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of related work in the domain of spoofing attack detection.
Section 3 describes the topology and the types of the implemented at-
tacks. Section 4 describes the proposed probabilistic IDS and the newly
introduced PVRS metric. Section 5 presents the experimental evaluation
setup, the impact of the implemented attack in V2V communication and
the proposed system for Dynamic Wireless Charging. It also includes the
experimental results of the probabilistic IDS. Section 6 contains a dis-
cussion of recent authentication and key-distribution techniques that are
used in VANETs in order to strengthen and secure the communication
process. Finally, Section 7 summarises our findings and concludes our
work.
2. Related work
The literature in the area of spoofing attacks in VANETs is divided in
two distinctive areas of interest. Firstly, techniques that use metrics from
the Application layer (APP), e.g. speed-deviation, such as Acceptance
Range Threshold (ART) [10]. Speed Deviation Verification at consecutive
time intervals has been also used for the verification of each vehicle
location. However, this metric is vulnerable against GPS spoofing attacks.
Swaszek et al. [11] consider the use of range-only information to detect
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing of a platoon of ve-
hicles equipped with inter-vehicle communications. This paper considers
the use of short range only information communicated amongst a platoon
of vehicles to detect GNSS spoofing. So the ability to detect spoofing
depends largely on the relative platoon geometry and the direction of
spoofing. These methods are mainly based on upper layer metrics, the
honesty of nearby vehicles and the traffic density of spoofing attackers.
However, there is a scarce number of proposed detection systems that use
a cross-layer approach.
Secondly, there is a specific area in which the publications also use
metrics from the PHY layer, such as the Received Signal Strength (RSS),
and metrics from the Application (APP) layer, such as speed-deviation of
nodes [12]. In various publications, the strength distribution analysis is
used to detect Sybil or Spoofing attacks [13]. The proposed is a cooper-
ative detection method, in which multiple neighbouring nodes cooperate
to measure the signal strength distribution of a suspicious node and
verify its physical position. However, the simulation results of [13]
indicate that given the unstable nature of radio propagation, this basic
cooperative method can only afford quite limited accuracy. To solve this
limited accuracy of the proposed model due to propagation delay or
packet losses, especially in VANETs, the concept of Presence Evidence
System (PES) is proposed in order to be ensured that nodes in the
opposite traffic are physical nodes and we can have them as the trusty
sources of signal strength measurements. However, the ability to detect
spoofing depends largely on this assumption that the opposite traffic is
trusty sources. The authors in Ref. [14] propose a solution to correct the
wrong position given by the fake GPS. The correction is based on a
validation process by comparing the given position to an Roadside Unit
(RSU) using the wireless Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communication (V2I).
However, the wireless communication between the transmitter and the
RSU can be impaired by fast fading characteristics such as shadowing
from buildings or other obstacles that exist in VANETs. Therefore, a
realistic IDS for a VANET must take into account parameters from the
PHY or MAC layer that indicate the communication problem. Moreover,
it is obvious that the proposed IDS is based on V2V communication only
and can be applied to a VANET without any extra infrastructure such as
RSUs.
Existing literature [13,14] uses RSUs as verifying base stations, with
publicly known true locations. The RSUs located in the transmission
range of the vehicles are used to verify the real received position from
satellite against the spoofed GPS transmitter. However, it is not clear
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explained how these RSU stations can be assumed as non-malicious. A
variety of approaches have been proposed in the literature to recognize
spoofing. Of interest here are methods which compare Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) information to measurements available from
other, non-GNSS sensors [11]. In Ref. [15] Carson and Bevly discussed
the use of range and bearing information with GPS positions to detect
spoofing for a platoon of vehicles. They assumed the availability of
Relative Position Vectors (RPVs) between pairs of vehicles from the radar
sensor. To detect spoofing of a single vehicle they compared these RPVs
to the corresponding GPS difference vector, declaring spoofing if the
difference was too great. Their focus was on a pair of vehicles only. All
the above mentioned techniques use the IVC for the interchange of
ranging information between nodes to detect anomalies that indicate
spoofing of the GPS positions. However, the wireless V2I communication
confronts the wireless interference from the entire location as well the
fading characteristics.
Last, extensive works present applications of spatial processing
methods for GPS spoofing detection and mitigation that use either Phase
Delay Measurements [16] or the Angle of Arrival (AoA) estimation [17]
from the PHY layer to verify the message originator. From an attacker
perspective, an illegitimate node may intentionally falsify information to
achieve a certain goal that might be rational in some scenarios. A
drawback of using metrics from the PHY layer is the incorrect GPS
spoofing detection (e.g. false alarms) that may occur in situations where
multiple correct satellite signals are received from similar directions and
phase delay differences are below a predefined threshold.
All the above publications do not use ML approaches for detecting
spoofing attacks. On the other hand, several articles such as [18,19]
introduce the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)-based schemes
for detecting spoofing attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) using
ML techniques without using a cross-layer architecture. based on detailed
analytical models for the mobile radio channel, the proposed algorithm
combines two classifiers to process and analyze the instant samples of
received signal strength to detect attacks. The algorithm is optimized for
scenarios where the legitimate node and the attacking node are at the
same distance or at a very close distance from each other in relation to a
landmark, which is the worst case scenario. A novel cross-layer IDS is
presented in Ref. [20] with high accuracy results. However, this IDS has
only been tested only in a platoon of vehicles application. Last, in
Ref. [21] an IDS is proposed based on a deep convolutional neural
network (DCNN) to protect the controller area network (CAN) bus of the
vehicle. The DCNN learns the network traffic patterns and detects mali-
cious traffic without hand-designed features. The experimental results
demonstrate that the proposed IDS has significantly low false negative
rates and error rates when compared to the conventional
machine-learning algorithms, increasing also the complexity of the
system.
In contrast to all the aforementioned works for the detection of a
spoofing attack using position verification techniques that is observed by
the GPS. We use an additional prototype metric named PVRS that com-
pares the distance traveled and is observed by the On-Board Units (OBU)
sensors with the estimated traveled distance using the relative speed
(Δu) metric between the sender and the receiver [22,23]. The novelty of
the Δu metric is that it can be estimated by the wireless channel of the
PHY layer using the effect of the Doppler phenomenon without extra
sensors or infrastructure. This estimated metric can be combined with
social mobility patterns constructing the PVRSmetric. Relative speed as a
metric can be combined with other metrics from the APP and the PHY
layer leading to a cross-layer detection approach. From the PHY layer
different metrics such as the RSSI, the Signal to Interference and Noise
Ratio (SINR) and Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) for the effective detection
of a spoofing attack are used.
3. System model
3.1. System description and topology
Two different charging systems are compared: one that uses a Static
Charging Station (SCS) only, and one that combines a SCS and a Mobile
Energy Disseminators (MED). We use different initial energy conditions
for all the EVs of the simulation. Our intelligent route search method
takes into account the waiting time either for the MED-EV appointment
or for the waiting time at the queue of an SCS, in the presence of a
spoofing attacker among the inner nodes of the system. It is shown that
the proposed method decreases significantly the waiting time for the
charging procedure and the charging time that is needed for an EV,
because the EV continues to charge along its route.
However, the presence of a spoofer in the system can either cause the
starvation of specific EVs for a long time interval or cause the rerouting of
the EVs for charging, which results in a significant increase in the overall
travel time. At initialisation, the system model is populated with a
number of EVs (50–200). From this point onwards, every node broad-
casts, at a time interval of δðtÞ ¼ 0:1 seconds, a CAM message to inform
either the SCS or the MED of its presence. All EVs are informed of the
waiting time either by the SCS or by the MED. This comes as a response
through the periodical communication with MEDs or SCS using the CAM
messages. Based on this information, an EV can choose either the SCS or
the MED for its charging needs whilst selecting the best route from its
starting point to its final destination.
For our simulated scenario, we use 3 inner nodes - vehicles of a
charging system. The 2 first vehicles represent the pair Attacker-
Receiver. The third vehicle is a legitimate vehicle, the Victim, whose
identity is spoofed by the attacker. The nodes that enter the system
broadcast periodically beacon messages, to inform of their presence and
update the MED and the SCS with information about their current loca-
tion. This beacon message contains a Node Identifier; the GPS co-
ordinates; the GPS speed; the current Timestamp and theMAC address. In
Fig. 1 the attacker (EV A) initially intercepts the Node Identifier (ID) of
EV I, when the EV I broadcasts the CAM to inform about its presence.
Then, the attacker immediately spoofs the ID of EV I to transmit CAMs
with false GPS location coordinates earlier than the legitimate CAMs sent
by the EV I. This means that most of the legitimate CAMs sent by the EV I
are lost or delayed due to the MAC backoff procedure. After that, the
receiving MED would be misdirected to an incorrect location, different
from the one agreed with EV I, interfering with the charging process.
The above scenario is not the only one that may occur. For example, a
spoofing attacker may launch a spoofing attack not only for their own
benefit. The attacker may aim to disrupt the operation of the system as a
form of Denial of Service (DoS) by virtue of the V2V communication
problem between EV I and EV B (see Section 3.2). In any case, the
developed IDS would need to distinguish between both legitimate CAMs
sent by EV I, and spoofed CAMs sent by EV A, both transmitted with the
ID of EV I.
It is well known that for broadcasting a packet in the 802.11p pro-
tocol, relay nodes may be involved in routing this packet to its final
Fig. 1. Topology. Beacon routing from EV A to the MED or the SCS. IDS
placement at the EV B.
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destination. The localisation of the proposed IDS is decided to be one step
before the SCS or the MED as can be seen in Fig. 1, which is located at the
transmission range (1000 m) of both the SCS and the MED. This role of
relay node has the EV B in which located the IDS and re-transmit a packet
from the EV I (which is the victim) either the EV A (which is the attacker)
until the destination which is either the MED or the SCS.
A specific example of the Dynamic Wireless Charging System that is
susceptible to a spoofing attack is described in Fig. 2. Firstly, Fig. 2a
shows the attacker that is randomly selected from one of the inner nodes
of the system. The attacker can either be located on a road which is in a
vertical position to the road the EV I is located on, or on the same road
and hence following the EV I. We investigate the case that the attacker is
initially located on a vertical road in relation to EV I, since the results are
similar in both cases.
Next, EV A intercepts the ID of EV I. As a consequence of the spoofing
attack, EV I loses its turn for charging (see Fig. 2b 2c). From this situation
the attacker EV A has benefited since it is that vehicle that ends up
following the MED for charging (see Fig. 2d). So, the victim can charge
only after the termination of the spoofing attack, greatly increasing its
waiting time for charging.
The blocking of the EV I must be detected by the proposed IDS to
maintain satisfactory levels for the overall travel time of the Dynamic
Wireless Charging System. A long term mitigation strategy could involve
the localisation of the attacker EV A and its exclusion by the charging
process.
3.2. Spoofing attack in V2V communication
All EVs in the proposed charging system periodically broadcast CAMs,
known as beacon messages, in order to inform neighbouring vehicles of
their presence. Each CAM comprises several fields such as Vehicle
Identifier (ID), Time instance, the MAC address and current vehicle GPS
location and speed.
Safety applications are very challenging for the design of a MAC
protocol in VANETs due to their low latency (less than 100 ms) and high
reliability requirements. However, the performance of the 802.11p MAC
protocol is highly affected by some key parameters, such as the packet
size of safety related message, the message generation function, the
vehicle density, the communication range, etc. Some of these parameters
are not set properly in recent proposed evaluations. Furthermore, as
stated in Ref. [24], there is significant concern if BSMs (Basic Safety
Messages) are constrained to be sent on the central control channel
(CCH) during the 50 ms CCH interval. This is because there could be
hundreds of devices in a given area and the collision rate could be very
high.
According to the IEEE 1609.4 coordination scheme, the channel time
is divided into synchronization intervals with a fixed length of 100 ms,
consisting of 50 ms (including 4 ms guard interval) alternating between
CCH and service channels (SCH). All vehicles stay in the control channel
during the CCH 50ms period and switch to one of the six service channels
during the SCH 50 ms period. However, the ID and the MAC address of
the sender in the WAVE Service Advertisement (WSA) frame [25] can be
modified by a spoofer. In addition, this spoofing attack can increase the
collision probability which has a negative effect on the performance of
the IEEE 802.11p MAC protocol, specifically in safety applications using
the above mentioned CCH intervals [26]. This situation arises if a node
stays in the CCH channel for a time interval longer than 50 ms. Other
factors need to be also defined, such as the number of vehicles than can
be accommodated in VANET safety applications with these specific CCH
intervals. The implications of the implemented spoofing attack are pre-
sented in more detail in Section 5.2. .
For the simulated attack scenario, initially, the EV I and EV B vehicles
have a wireless connection established using the IEEE 802.11p MAC
protocol. The attacker EV A approaches the EV I and EV B vehicles. When
Fig. 2. Spoofing Attack effects on MEDs.
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the EV A approaches the EV B in a distance within the transmission range
of 1000m, the attacker intercepts the ID andMAC address of EV I from the
broadcasting CAMs and starts its spoofing attack. During the spoofing
attack, EV A also broadcasts a CAM message every 0.1 s, using the ID of
EV I, in order to inform the EV B about an incorrect GPS location and
speed value. Since the attacker replicates the ID andMAC address of EV I,
during the spoofing attack, there would be WSA frames showing dis-
crepancies between the identity and the physical characteristic of the
frames.
The routing flow that is selected in the transport layer is based on the
incorrect spoofed MAC address of the transmitter EV I. This results in
frame losses in the PHY layer due to path losses and fast fading factors, or
due to the strict delay constraints of the backoff procedure in the MAC
layer. Hence, many CAMs sent by EV I are lost in the MAC layer and are
never acknowledged by the client, which increases the Packet Error Rate
(PER) and also decreases the throughput. So it is clear that the spoofing
attack affects the communication channel. This attack can be also used as
an another kind of a DoS attack. The designed IDS aims to detect these
discrepancies in the communication channel.
As discussed earlier, the attacker exploits these fields to transmit false
GPS location coordinates within the CAMs, which misdirects the EV I to
an incorrect location. As a consequence the observed RSSI values of the
wireless communication between Transmitter- EV I (Tx) and Receiver- EV
B (Rx) to move to a different level, indicating the spoofing attack.
Fig. 3 shows a comparison between the RSSI values obtained at the
receiver that corresponds to different distances between the Transmitter
and Receiver vehicles during the first two stages of the simulation (i.e., the
initial period of normal traffic and the spoofing attack). The initial period
of normal traffic is between the time interval (10–70 s), while the
spoofing attack is conducted in the time interval between (70–85 s).
When the position of the transmitter, which is the spoofer during the
spoofing attack, is quite different from the legitimate vehicle’s position,
the level of the RSSI values change significantly as can be seen in Fig. 3.
This can indicate the spoofing attack, but also shows that the RSSI maybe
is a crucial metric for the detection of a spoofing attack in a cross-layer
ML approach.
4. The probabilistic IDS
4.1. Supervised ML techniques
The k-NN is a simple Machine Learning (ML) technique for pattern
recognition, based on feature similarity [27]. When we say a technique is
non-parametric, it means that it does not make any assumptions on the
underlying data distribution. Therefore, k-NN could and probably should
be one of the first choices for a classification study when there is little or
no prior knowledge about the distribution of the data points. k-NN is also
a lazy algorithm (as opposed to an eager algorithm). What this means is
that it does not use the training data points to do any generalisation. In
other words, there is no explicit training phase or it is very minimal. In
other words, the training phase is pretty fast. So, the k-NN algorithm is
also useful for non-linear data, which is the case for the data we use for
training in this study.
The Random Forest (RF) is a supervised learning algorithm, based on
decision tree models that split a subset of features at training time and
output the class that has the majority votes of the classes of the individual
trees [28]. This supervised learning algorithm is preferred over others for
the following reasons. Firstly, it can be used for both classification and
regression tasks, providing high accuracy. Secondly, if there are more
trees, it does not allow overfitting trees in the model. It has the power to
handle a large data set with higher dimensionality. Lastly, the RF clas-
sifier can handle missing values while maintaining the accuracy of a large
proportion of data.
Each of the classification algorithms is able to generate accurate re-
sults when implemented independently. However, the combined use of
these algorithms may help improve the overall performance of an IDS
[29]. Different methodologies were evaluated to assess whether the
classification results could be improved, for instance, by applying data
fusion techniques.
Ensemble learning has been used to combine the outputs from
different classification techniques. Ensemble learning is the process in
which multiple classifiers are strategically selected and combined in
order to solve a particular computational intelligence problem. Ensemble
learning is primarily used to improve the classification performance of a
model. One of the most commonly used ensemble learning algorithms is
known as Bagging [30]. In this algorithm, bootstrapped replicas of the
training data for each classifier (RF, k-NN) are used. During the last step
of Bagging, the majority voting combination rule is used. Since the
intended output of the IDS is a probabilistic IDS, the conditional proba-
bilities are estimated for each classifier in the presented IDS using the
Bayesian rule as a data fusion technique.
4.2. Position verification metric and localisation of the attacker
The presented IDS uses cross-layer metrics for training from both the
PHY and APP layers. From the PHY layer we extract the RSSI, the SINR
and the PDR. From the APP layer we extract the relative speed (Δu) and
the GPS coordinates, each one used for the generation of the Position
Verification using Relative Speed (PVRS) metric. We must also compare
the GPS location observed by the On-Board Unit (OBU) with the esti-
mated location using the relative speed metric. This procedure results in
a new novel metric called PVRS. All these metrics, listed in Table 1, are
used in a cross-layer approach to improve the detection accuracy of the
IDS. Furthermore, for the training-testing procedure of the proposed IDS,
the data have been divided into 70% for training and 30% for testing.
The relative speed (Δu), introduced in Ref. [23], indicates the relative
speed between an attacker EV A and the receiver EV B:
ΔuA ¼ j u!A  u!Bj (1)
where u!A, u!B are the speed of the attacker and the receiver, respec-
tively. The metric Δu can be effectively estimated by the RF signals’
interchange in the PHY layer. The novelty of this metric is that it can be
estimated by the physical properties of the wireless channel, using the
effect of the Doppler phenomenon [22].
To create the proposed PVRSmetric we must make some fundamental
assumptions. Specifically, we assume as reliable the communication be-
tween the Tx-Rx at the initial time instant and an initial distance dx
Fig. 3. Different RSSI levels during the normal operation and spoofing attack.
Table 1
Metrics that are jointly processed by the classification algorithms.
ID Model Feature Short Description
1 PVRS Position Verification using estimated Δu
2 RSSI Signal Strength Indicator (dBm)
3 SINR Signal Quantity Indicator (dB)
4 PDR Packet Delivery Ratio
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between the two nodes. From this time onward the difference ΔðxÞ be-
tween distance dxðt1Þ between Tx-Rx at the time t 1 and distance
dxðtÞ after a verifying time interval of δðtÞ ¼ 0:1 is used as verification
distance. This relative movement ΔðxÞ of the transmitter-receiver pair is
calculated by their OBUs, according to the transmitter-receiver GPS co-
ordinates in two dimensions with respect to the traffic ahead.
This mobility pattern can be justified by the social mobility patterns
that are introduced in Ref. [31] for clustering needs. So we can compare
the distance ΔðxÞ observed by the OBU with the estimated distance
ΔðxÞest using the estimated relative speed value Δu between Tx-Rx. This
estimated distance is in essence a relative mobility parameter kijx be-
tween the nodes i-j, which is a parameter indicating whether the force
among the nodes is positive or negative (acceleration or deceleration).
This value depends on whether the vehicles are approaching or moving





where the kTxRx ¼ ΔuδðtÞ is the rate of change of speed (acceleration or the
deceleration value) indicating the ratio of divergence or convergence
among moving nodes Tx-Rx at the duration δðtÞ ¼ 0:1s. Comparing the
estimated distance ΔðxÞest with the distance ΔðxÞ that is observed by
OBU, we can get the proposed metric PVRS.
It can be seen that the Algorithm 1 for the generation of the PVRS
metric is based on position verification. The algorithm firstly examines if
the Tx and Rx vehicles approach each other or move away from each
other. This is determined by the sign of the ddu value, which is the dif-
ference between the previous relative speed value at the time instant t 1
and the current relative speed value at the time instant t.
Afterwards, if the difference between the ΔðxÞest and ΔðxÞ values is in
the range of an apriori average spoofing deviation value (r ¼ 10 m), this
indicates the normal operation of the system although we note this value
is a quite small threshold for the detection of a spoofing attack. So, we can
set the PVRS value equal to the previous value in Algorithm 1. Otherwise,
there is a quite large deviation between the estimated distance and the
distance observed by the GPS. In that case, the PVRS value will be
increased by one indicating the start of a spoofing attack. The PVRS value
will change again at the end of the spoofing attack, because the legitimate
transmitter is located in a different position to the spoofer.
Using this approach, a continuous line can be constructed which will
join the points that indicate either the normal behavior or the spoofing
attack as a form of linear interpolation technique [32]. The spoofing
deviation value is an average error which is added in the difference in
distance between a claimed position and the real physical position.
This algorithm for the PVRS metric which is based on the position
verification is presented in Algorithm 1. Therefore, the entire area is then
partitioned into small areas (called subnetworks) that can be investigated
in isolation for the detection of a spoofing attacker. A subnetwork can be
assumed an ellipse whose foci are the Tx and Rx vehicles. This ensures
that all objects whose sum of distances from Tx and to Rx (i.e., from Tx to
object and from object to Rx) is less than 1000 m, (this is the maximum
communicating distance for 802.11p) are accounted for.
Algorithm 1 PVRS Algorithm
M ¼ number of observations at consecutive time instants
r ¼ 10m
t ¼ 0
PVRS ← matrixðnrow¼ M; ncol¼ 1Þ
ΔðxÞ ← matrixðnrow¼ M; ncol¼ 1Þ maxtrix of OBU’s observations
Δu ← matrixðnrow¼ M; ncol¼ 1Þ maxtrix of estimated relative speed
t þþ
while ðt<¼ MÞ do
dduðtÞ ¼ Δuest ðt 1Þ  Δuest ðtÞ
if dduðtÞ > 0 then




(continued on next column)
(continued )
Algorithm 1 PVRS Algorithm
if ΔðxÞest ðtÞ  r <¼ ΔðxÞ then
PVRSðtÞ ← PVRSðt  1Þ
else
PVRSðtÞ ← PVRSðt  1Þþ 1
end if
else




ifΔðxÞest ðtÞþ r >¼ ΔðxÞthen
PVRSðtÞ ← PVRSðt  1Þ
else





An example in Fig. 4 indicates the different values that get the PVRS
metric for a spoofing or a normal traffic during a time interval. Every
change in the value of the PVRS metric indicates the end or the start of a
spoofing attack.
After the detection of the spoofing attack the node that launches this
type of attack must be localised and excluded from the system. Given the
initial distance dxðt¼ 0Þ between Tx-Rx as reference distance and the
estimated distanceΔðxÞest after the specific time interval that is estimated
in Algorithm 1, we can estimate the accurate location of the attacker. We
have already mentioned that the transmitter’s GPS coordinates are
known to the Rx. This technique for the localisation of the attacker can be
seen as being similar to the one proposed in Ref. [19] where the spatial
correlation of the received RSSI inherited from wireless nodes can be
used for determining the true location. Both techniques use the values of
the wireless communication in the physical layer of the 802.11p protocol
for the localisation. Either the estimated relative speed value Δu that is
estimated through the physical layer or the RSSI value at the Rx.
5. Experimental evaluation
To evaluate the effect of a spoofing attack on the Dynamic Wireless
Charging of EVs, our experimental evaluation has been conducted using
simulations in the city of Erlangen, as shown in Fig. 5. We used the
Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) and the OMNETþþ/VEINS [33].
SUMO is adopted as our traffic simulator and OMNETþþ is used to
simulate the wireless communication. Furthermore, the GEMV (a
geometry-based efficient propagation model for V2V) [34] tool was in-
tegrated into the VEINS network simulator for a more realistic simulation
of the PHY layer. For describing the modeled area GEMV uses the out-
lines of vehicles, buildings and foliage. Based on the outlines of the ob-
jects, it forms R-trees. R-tree is a tree data structure in which objects in
the field are bound by rectangles and are hierarchically structured based
Fig. 4. Different PVRS value levels during the normal operation and spoof-
ing attack.
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on their location in space. Hence, GEMV employs a simple
geometry-based small-scale signal variation model and calculates the
additional stochastic signal variation and the number of diffracted and
reflected rays based on the information about the surrounding objects.
GEMV was configured and modified to be portable to the VEINS simu-
lator and incorporated into this. Last, to setup and test our classification
algorithms for the spoofing attacks detection on the previously obtained
data, we chose to use the programming language R [35].
5.1. Evaluation setup
As can be seen in Fig. 5, a bus which follows a specific route acts as
MED. The route followed by the MED is represented in yellow. Further-
more, an SCS is found at a fixed location at the road side of the corre-
sponding city district. All the parametric side roads of the area in which
the SCS and MED charging models are located are used as starting points
ðskÞ for the DynamicWireless Charging Systemwith the same probability.
The point at which the EVs are introduced in SCS or MED system is shown
in Fig. 5 with (mb; sb respectively).
There are between 50 and 200 EVs in the simulated environment.
Additionally, each EV k entering the simulation has starting energy
charge (εks ) defined according to a uniform distribution with values be-
tween 1 and 6 kWh. 60% of the EVs need recharging and are considered
as anxious drivers (i.e the starting energy charge is smaller than the
energy required to complete its travel).
The only communication paths available are via the ad-hoc network
and there is no other communication infrastructure. All the above pa-
rameters and the selected evaluated area were chosen in way that does
not favour any charging method (MED or SCS). The power of the antenna
is Ptx ¼ 18dBm and the communication frequency f is 5:9Ghz. In our
simulations, we use a minimum sensitivity (Pth) of  69dBm to  85dB,
which gives a transmission range of about 1000 m, as can be seen in
Table 2. As a result of the above transmission range, there is no
communication with a few EVs. So, a number of EVs are excluded from
the charging procedure because of the communication lost between EVs.
This happens when the SINR threshold is below 10 dB due to attenuation
that is caused by the building obstacles of the city.
After 60 s of normal operation of the proposed Dynamic Wireless
Charging a spoofing attacker node is inserted in the systems and conducts
a spoofing attacks with duration about 25 s. The overall simulation uti-
lizes a set of 1000 observations equally split into the two implemented
scenarios examined (normal operation and spoofing attack). To avoid
overfitting1 only 30% of the total number of the observations are used for
training while the remaining 70% for testing.
5.2. Effect of spoofing attack in the V2V MAC layer
In order to show the effect of the spoofing attack on the communi-
cation between the Transmitter (Tx) and Receiver (Rx) vehicles, the
throughput has been plotted in Fig. 6. The Y-axis represents the
throughput in Mbps, whereas the X-axis represents the time in seconds.
The normal (i.e., without attack) communication between the Tx - Rx
vehicles is represented in pink and the spoofing attack is represented in
blue. The effective packets interchange without interfering the attacker
between the Tx and Rx vehicles is the time interval between 0 and 60 s.
The spoofing attack is launched during the time interval 60–85 s.
As can be seen in Fig. 6, the average throughput for the normal
communication is 18 Mbps, approximately. When the spoofing attack is
launched, the average throughput drops to 8 Mbps. This change in the
throughput clearly shows that the modification of the GPS coordinates
and speed values within the CAM messages has a clear effect upon the
communication between the connected vehicles.
Focusing on the effect of the spoofing attack on the IEEE 802.11p
MAC layer, the IEEE 802.11p protocol employs Hybrid Coordination
Function (HCF) contention-based channel access Enhanced Distributed
Channel Access (EDCA) as the MAC method. This is an enhanced version
of the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) of the IEEE 802.11 pro-
tocol. The EDCA uses Carrier Sense Multiple Access with collision
avoidance (CSMA/CA). In the EDCA scheme, a node willing to transmit
will sense the medium, and if the medium is idle for greater than or equal
to an Arbitration Inter-Frame Space [Access Class] (AIFS[AC]) period,
the node starts transmitting directly. If the channel becomes busy during
the AIFS[AC], the node will defer the transmission by selecting a random
backoff time. The spoofing attack of node EV A has as effect when the
legitimate EV I wants to transmit and find the channel busy initiating the
backoff procedure. In Fig. 7, the busy time for every MAC transmission
every Time Step (in total 200 Time Steps) from the victim node EV I to
the receiver EV B is shown. From the results in Fig. 7, the effect of the
spoofing attack in MAC layer is evident. Without the spoofing attack, the
maximum busy time value reaches only 3.8 ms, whereas the maximum
busy time reaches about 8.5 ms when the spoofing attack is conducted,
increasing substantially the probability of collisions.
Fig. 8 shows the average MAC delay TMAC for different density of
Fig. 5. Section of the Erlangen city map used to conduct the simulations. The
MED route is marked in yellow. The position of the SCS is marked in green. The
arrows in cyan point at the journey starting points of the EVs. The buildings are




Independent parameters Range of values
Number of vehicles 50–200
Initial Energy (εks ) 1-6 kWh
Ptx 18dBm
f 5.9Ghz
Packet length 750 bits
Packet Header length 256 bits
Minimum sensitivity ðPthÞ 69dBm to 85dB
Transmission range 1000 meters
Fig. 6. Throughput (Mbps) of the communication between the Tx and Rx ve-
hicles during the experimental simulation. The normal communication without
attack in pink and spoofing attack in blue.
1 Overfitting occurs when the classifier tends to memorize the training set and
thus generalize poorly when facing previously unseen data.
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vehicles with the standard central control channel (CCH) interval setting
of 50 ms. The TMAC is the time delay that occurs at the MAC layer since
the safety message arrived to MAC layer until the message is finally sent
out. The end-to-end delay TE2E depends mostly on TMAC and the propa-
gation delay. This work only focuses on TMAC increase caused by spoofing
attacks. As it can be seen in Fig. 7, the TMAC increase is directly propor-
tional to the density of vehicles. An increase in the number of vehicles, as
well as a decrease of the CCH interval will cause more contention and
more backoff time. Hence, the MAC delay TMAC is mostly driven by the
backoff time.
Moreover, the MAC delay is always less than 100 ms in all the
simulated scenarios. It indicates that IEEE 802.11p MAC protocol can
satisfy the latency requirement (i.e. less than 100 ms) in VANET safety
applications [26]. It can be observed in Fig. 8 that, with the presence of
spoofing attack in Dynamic Wireless Charging System, the TMAC delay
reaches over 45 ms with a traffic density of 200 EVs per kilometer (EVs=
km) in need of charging in the area. This value of MAC delay is very close
to the CCH interval, which is 50ms. As a result, it becomes difficult for EV
I to have access to one of the six service channels (SCH) channels. This
combination of the MAC delay with the traffic density can be assumed as
a marginal threshold for the proposed dynamic charging system. This is
because if the TMAC delay exceeds the 50 ms (CCH interval) the estab-
lished wireless connection using the IEEE 802.11p MAC protocol be-
tween two EVs in fact will be questionable due to the collision probability
increase.
5.3. Effect of spoofing attack on the overall travel time
This section compares two different charging system scenarios, with
and without a spoofing attack. The first charging system scenario con-
tains only an SCS, and the second scenario contains both an SCS and a
MED. In the two scenarios with a spoofing attack, the malicious node
replicates the identity of the EV A (ID ¼ 40). Fig. 9 represents average
travel times for a total number of 100 EVs in the system. It is obvious
from the results that the insertion of the spoofing node with ID ¼ 40
causes a significant increase in average travel time. The routing optimi-
sation [8] which is applied to the Dynamic Wireless System is negatively
affected. The optimum EVs charging order is altered, which causes an
increase in the average travel time value of the system.
Focusing specifically on the system that uses only an SCS, the dif-
ference of the average overall travel time with and without the presence
of spoofing attack is about 5min, which increases the average total travel
time by 10%. This increase is even more noticeable in the scenario with
an SCS and a MED. In this case, travel time difference with and without
the presence of spoofing attack is about 8min, increasing the average
total travel time by 13%. The travel time difference is slightly higher in
this second scenario because the MED, which is a mobile node, contrib-
utes with additional propagation delay in the V2V communication. This
is also caused by the spoofing attack.
Additionally, Fig. 10a compares the average waiting time of each EV
at the point that it is planned to meet and follow the MED when the
spoofing attack is conducted with the average waiting time of each EV
after the mitigation of the spoofing attack. It can be seen that the spoofing
attack increases the waiting time by 10%. Similarly, Fig. 10b compares
the average queue time in the SCS when a spoofing attacker enters the
system and the average queue time after the exclusion of this node from
the charging process after the mitigation of the spoofing attack. The ef-
fect of the attack is clearly shown with the high difference between the
two values. The queue time increases about 30% after the EV with ID ¼
40 launches the spoofing attack. This is due to the re-ordering of the
dynamic charging process after the presence of the spoofing attacker.
Hence, this delays the overall dynamic charging process. As a conse-
quence, most EVs would select the SCS for charging, which in turn in-
creases significantly the queue time.
Finally, it is also noticeable that, with the presence of a spoofing
attacker in the system, the average waiting time increases with the same
rate as the average queue time. This finding also verifies that the spoofing
attack violates the right order of charging process having as consequence
the increase of the waiting time for the proposed charging system (SCSþ
MED), as the number of EVs is increased. Therefore, this balances the
performance of the two charging system scenarios (i.e. SCS and SCS þ
MED). On the contrary, after the mitigation of the spoofing attacker, as
the simulation time increases, the waiting time for MED and the queue
time for SCS both increase and decreases irregularly. This happens
because there are two choices for charging of EVs (MED or SCS) that are
quickly interchanged.
5.4. IDS performance
We evaluated the performance of our attack detector by using a
detection rate and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, which
Fig. 7. Busy Time (ms) of the communication between EV I and EV B vehicles
during the experimental simulation. The normal communication without attack
in pink and has a duration of 200 Time Steps (20 s), whereas the spoofing attack
in blue has a duration of 170 Time Steps (17 s).
Fig. 8. MAC Layer Delay TMAC (ms) of the communication between EV I and EV
B vehicles during the experimental simulation using a range of 200EVs= km. The
normal communication without attack in pink. While the spoofing attack in blue.
Fig. 9. Average Travel Time comparison between the two different charging
system scenarios, with and without a spoofing attack.
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is a probability curve since the proposed system is probabilistic. Another
evaluation metric used is the area under curve (AUC) which represents
the degree or measure of separability between classes. Thus, the higher
AUC score, the better our model can distinguish between classes. The last
metric that we use for the evaluation of the proposed cross-layer IDS is
the accuracy. Informally, accuracy is the fraction of predictions our
model got right in the total of predictions.
In order to evaluate the adaptability of the presented IDS in detecting
a spoofing attack in a Dynamic Wireless Charging System, additional
experiments have been conducted. These experiments combine the
implemented spoofing attack with the normal operation of Dynamic
Wireless Charging System as two separates classes. Our proposed IDS,
using the k-NN and RF algorithms, was trained and tested on both the
absence and presence of the PVRS feature. The presence of the PVRS
feature in our data set played a major role in detecting the attack, since
both k-NN and RF algorithms achieved high, and equal, accuracy scores
of 91:3%. Although the accuracy of each model is the same, they produce
very different AUC scores. The RF algorithm excels, having a score of
0.986 as can be seen in Fig. 12, while the k-NN algorithm has an AUC
score of 0.935. On the other hand, the absence of the PVRS feature im-
pacts our results negatively. The accuracy of both the k-NN and RF al-
gorithms drops to 84:9% and 85:6% respectively. The AUC score drops
slightly (0.956) for the Random Forest in comparison to the higher drop
(0.839) noticed in the k-NN algorithm. This is shown in Fig. 11.
It can be seen from the previous experiments that most of the dis-
crepancies between the two ML algorithms used for the classification
results are observed when the PVRS is not used for training and testing.
So, a data fusion method for our Dynamic Wireless Charging System
could be used in this case. The Data Fusion approach combines the
outcome of the two supervised ML classifiers. As observed in Fig. 13, the
data fusion method combines the two algorithms and actually produces a
better result.
Last, in Table 3 we summarize the classification accuracy, exploiting
the usage of the proposed PVRSmetric as an extra feature for training and
testing or not using both the k-NN and k-NN algorithm. Comparing the
accuracy results with the usage of the PVRSmetric with those without the
Fig. 11. Spoofing Attack Detection: ROC curve for cross-layer approach using
the k-NN algorithm.
Fig. 12. : Spoofing Attack Detection: ROC curve for cross-layer approach using
the RF algorithm.
Fig. 10. Average Waiting Time for MED, Queue Time of SCS with the presence
of spoofer and after the mitigation procedure; (a) Average Waiting Time for
MED with the presence of spoofer attacker vs Average Waiting Time for MED
after the mitigation with excluding the EV with ID ¼ 40 from the charging
process; (b) Queue Time of SCS with the presence of spoofer attacker vs Queue
Time of SCS after the mitigation with excluding the EV with ID ¼ 40 from the
charging process.
Fig. 13. Spoofing Attack Detection: ROC curves for cross-layer approach using
the Data Fusion between two supervised ML algorithms.
Table 3
Classification accuracy percentages exploiting the usage of the PVRS metric or
not.
k-NN RF
PVRS metric 91.3% 91.3%
without PVRS metric 84.9% 85.6%
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usage of PVRSmetric we can observe an 6:4% accuracy increase for the k-
NN algorithm and a corresponding 5:7% accuracy increase for the RF
algorithm.
6. Discussion
Today security and anonymity in group communications play even
more vital role due to the increased level of threats that appear on a daily
basis. A strong difference is that now the new generation networks
possess highly dynamic characteristics through information exchange
among automated vehicles. Moreover, when specific time critical appli-
cations are running on top of communication between cars, as the dy-
namic charging framework described in this article, security is even more
important. Authentication and key-distribution methods can be used in
order to strengthen and secure the communication process amongst the
various entities of the system. Many research works that can provide
security and privacy in VANETs have been proposed during the last years.
Authors in Ref. [36] proposed the use of anonymous certificates and a
modification of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the provision of
authentication and integrity. The OBUs which are on board the vehicles
are equipped with a large number of public and private key pairs that can
use for communicating with neighbouring cars. Authors in Ref. [37]
came out with an anonymous authentication scheme in order to make a
VANET robust to several attacks, including an impersonation attack.
Finally authors in Ref. [38] present a detailed analysis of privacy pres-
ervation methods for ad hoc social networks, including VANETs. As
future work we plan to combine the proposed IDS with a Key Distribution
System that would increase the security without increasing computa-
tional cost thus demanding central entities, such as RSUs to act as central
authorities.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) based on super-
vised Machine Learning (ML) algorithms was developed to detect
spoofing attackers and exclude them from the proposed system for Dy-
namic Wireless Charging with Mobile Energy Disseminators (MEDs), as a
mitigation approach. Specific showcases of the proposed Dynamic
Wireless Charging with MEDs are investigated with the presence of an
inner node of the system as a spoofing attacker. These cases show that the
average total time is increased by about 13% in the system (SCSþMED),
because of the re-ordering of the charging process Dynamic Wireless
Charging System with MEDs. This re-ordering of the charging process
with MEDs increases the requests for charging with SCS, and results in an
increase of the average queue time in SCS by about 30%. While the in-
crease of the average waiting time for MED due to the spoofing attack is
at about 10%.
The above results point to the need of a probabilistic IDS to detect and
mitigate the spoofing attacker. The proposed cross-layer IDS achieves a
good accuracy at about 91% using either the k-NN or the RF algorithm.
Moreover, a new metric Position Verification using Relative Speed
(PVRS) is proposed that compares the distance between two communi-
cated nodes that is observed by on-board Units (OBU) and the estimated
distance that is estimated using the Δu value estimated by the inter-
changed signals in the PHY layer. The effect of this new PVRS metric in
the performance of the proposed probabilistic IDS has proved to be an
increase in accuracy by about 6%, using both supervised ML algorithms.
Furthermore, due to the discrepancies that occurred in the classification
performance of the two ML algorithms without using the PVRS metric, a
data fusion method between these algorithms (k-NN, RF) has proved to
have clearly superior performance compared with each individual ML
algorithm.
Lastly, this paper has demonstrated the communication problem that
is provoked on Dynamic Wireless Charging System with MEDs with an
attacker, and can be considered as a trigger for more complex attacks
with more attackers.
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